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INTRODUCTION 
Remembrance runs throughout The Tempest in two markedly different and 
conflicting formations. Both these configurations are directly concerned with questions of 
subjectivity and alternate modes of conceiving the historical past. The first of these two 
practices of remembrance is utilized by Prospero throughout the play: asserting 
remembrance as death, Prospero attempts to petrify the world around him by enforcing a 
re-memory that recalls a selectively determined picture of the past that strengthens the 
telos of his futurist project. Ariel disrupts and fragments this project by using reiterative 
praxis to enforce remembrance as a resistance that brings to light the remains Prospero 
has discarded in this strategic construction of the past. These omitted shards that Ariel 
brings back to the fore work to reveal the reality of Prospero’s own present violences and 
the demand for accountability that they open up for him and the future he’s imagined as 
free of any such need to keep the past open. If Prospero utilizes remembrance as a means 
of simultaneously killing subjectivities and covering over that very violence, Ariel 
reiterates and ethically transforms this compulsion by remembering instead the forgotten 
or veiled violences that threaten to unsettle Prospero’s claims about the past. By 
deploying repetition with ethically oriented difference in response to Prospero’s 
commands, Ariel fosters the mobilization of all the inhabitants of the isle. What Ariel 
ultimately achieves is a reiterative and repersonating ethic that remembers the dead and 
the past they are a part of in a manner that ensures that the space of ethical accountability 
remains open and forever mobile. 
Before moving on to further delineate the two types of remembrance working 
throughout The Tempest that I aim to identify, it will be useful to outline the particular 
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valences of the queer ethical praxis I argue Ariel brings to the text. It is an ethic that 
opposes the mortification and objectification of subjectivities both figuratively and 
literally dead. These figuratively dead are the socially dead, rigidified within a confined 
functionality that allows Prospero to use them as he sees fit. The fixity of identity that 
this social death entails limits the mobility and potentialities of resistance that Ariel’s 
queer theoretical praxis aims to facilitate. The literally dead that are implicated in this 
ethic are the dead of the past who continuously impel an imperative toward historical 
accountability. This distinction between the socially and literally dead is not a necessarily 
fruitful one to make, however, for what is at stake in both is the potentiality of a 
movement that keeps both identities and history at large permeable and thus in constant 
play. An insistence on incompletion and indeterminacy necessitates a deferral of closure 
that refuses to participate in Prospero’s fantasy of eventual finality, choosing instead to 
render the world in constant flux, suspended in a state of ever-shifting indeterminacy that 
opens up possibilities for overhaul.1  
“At this hour / Lies at my mercy all mine enemies” (4.1.59-60), Prospero declares 
at the close of Act 4: “Shortly shall all my labours end” (4.1.61). Prospero here links the 
hold he has acquired over his enemies to the completion of his project, and by so doing 
reveals the necessary link between restraining his challengers and reaching this final 
closure his plot works toward. Prospero freezes his enemies so that he may freeze his 
project at large. By enforcing a selective remembrance that recalls debts owed him, 
Prospero presents a carefully crafted version of the past that seeks to justify his actions so 
that he will not need to be held accountable for them. As revealed in part by his ongoing 
preoccupation with the minute machinations of the plot he enacts, Prospero is heavily 
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invested in a successful and conclusive ending to his scheme, an investment that would 
be threatened by an acknowledgement of the indebtedness he himself accumulates 
through the use and abuse he inflicts upon those sharing the isle with him. His 
understanding of this fact is illustrated at the opening of Act 4, when he tells Ferdinand 
“If I have too austerely punished you, / Your compensation makes amends, for I / Have 
given you here a third of mine own life” (4.1.1-3). Prospero refuses to be beholden to 
anyone, and this refusal most frequently takes the form of the selective remembrance that 
veils his own debts and violences while obsessively reminding others of their own. 
Prospero is fixated on amends, on enforcing a reconciliation that will put the errors of the 
past to rest and bring his efforts to a definitive close. The moral missteps he himself falls 
into in acquiring this reconciliation must, then, be whitewashed, and he ensures that this 
veiling of his own violences is achieved by being strategic about how the past is 
recounted when he compels it to be. 
Ariel, as Prospero’s closest servant, is the character who spends the most time 
fulfilling Prospero’s need to have the imaginary past rearticulated. As illustrated by an 
exchange between the two that has Ariel agreeing to carry out Prospero’s commands “to 
th’ syllable” (2.1.505), Ariel sees and takes advantage of Prospero’s compulsive 
dependence on repetition, be it through a command that must be exactly recapitulated or 
though his incessant concern with the imagined forgetfulness of those in his thrall.2 Ariel, 
however, does not repeat, he reiterates, and by so doing reveals the ethical nature of 
reiterative praxis itself.3 His reiterative utterances become likeness with a difference, 
undergoing a transformation that retains the seeming intent of the originary command 
while imbuing enough ethically oriented difference to mobilize its rearticulation and 
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unsettle the futurist trajectory of its original aim. Ariel, singing to Ferdinand in Act 1, 
Scene 2, encapsulates the reiterative and transformative quality he deploys throughout the 
course of the text to offer an ethical counter to the “rough[ness]” (5.1.50) of Prospero’s 
commemorative demands: “Nothing of him that doth fade / But doth suffer a sea-change / 
Into something rich and strange” (1.2.403-405). Throughout the text, Ariel carries out his 
commands as he must, but his repetition becomes reiteration, or repetition with a “sea-
change” (1.2.404). In making his commands rich, strange, and radically indeterminate, 
Ariel takes Prospero’s will to re-memory and holds it accountable for the violences it 
attempts to veil, opening up the temporal permeability a queer ethic necessitates and 
assuring that Prospero’s fantasy of a reconciled and static world is unveiled as an 
impossible one.  
 
“NOW DOES MY PROJECT GATHER TO A HEAD”: PROSPERO, FUTURITY, AND THE 
NARRATIVE VIOLENCE OF RE-MEMORY  
 Prospero’s investment in an ending is asserted once more in the opening line of 
the closing act of the play, in which he tells Ariel: “Now does my project gather to a 
head” (5.1.1). Prospero has at this point achieved just about all he has set out to do from 
the beginning. Antonio and his men are fully frozen in his thrall, and he is prepared to 
move on to the final, purging punishment that will seemingly restore the peace and unity 
that Antonio’s originary crime undid. “Shortly shall all my labours end” (4.1.61); “Now 
does my project gather to a head” (5.1.1): the rhetoric of near completion that Prospero 
utilizes illustrates the reality of the end goal that he seeks. It is not revenge that Prospero 
here privileges or makes reference to, but the closure and fulfillment that this revenge 
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will bring about. With Antonio and his men now literally fixed in place, Prospero 
prepares to inflict the punishment that will act as a reconciling conclusion to both his plot 
and the injustices of the past at large. The telos that Prospero anticipates will petrify all 
that came before it, catalyzing a return to an Imaginary past free of violences, debts, and 
the temporizing need to make either punishing or compensatory amends for all such 
charges. This completed future resonates with Lee Edelman’s notion of futurity, which 
similarly “marks the impossible place of an Imaginary past exempt from the deferrals 
intrinsic to the future and projected ahead as the site at which being and meaning are 
joined as One” (Edelman 10). It is this stasis that Prospero anticipates and puts so much 
effort into achieving: the stasis that necessarily accompanies a telos, an ending, or a 
close. By striving toward a petrification of temporality that unifies an illusorily perfected 
past with an identically sealed-off future, Prospero desires the stagnation of history itself, 
stripped of the porousness that accountability demands.  
  The question of retrospection in the play has received a lot of critical attention.4 
Paul Brown has noted the ways in which Prospero utilizes enforced remembrance to 
interpolate those around him, asserting that “a remembrance of things past [is] soon 
revealed as a mnemonic of power” (Brown 59). Evelyn Tribble similarly posits that 
“Prospero figures himself as the sole retainer of the past” (Tribble 156). That Prospero 
deploys his version of the past as a reification of control is clear. The relationship this 
narrative of re-memory has to his futurist conceptions of history in general remains 
unquestioned, however, and I would like to examine how Prospero’s remembrance 
functions specifically as an imposition of both social and temporal death. I posit that 
Prospero’s enmeshment of social and temporal stasis is played out most discernibly 
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through the space of Alonso’s illusorily drowned body that he forces Ariel to recount in 
Act 1, Scene 2. Having Ariel perform a song for Ferdinand that alerts him of his father’s 
death while simultaneously commemorating said death, Prospero unwittingly reveals the 
three major processes he enacts to bolster the efficacy of his project: firstly, his reliance 
on imposing dead citizenship upon those around him that renders them confined but still 
useful for his purposes; secondly, the manner in which he attempts to veil the violences 
of this enforced death; and, finally, his particular configuration of remembrance as that 
which seeks to entomb, put to rest, and close off the past. 
  Alonso, symbolically killed and remembered only so Prospero can ensure 
Ferdinand’s compliance with his plot, captures the simultaneous death and functionality 
Prospero makes full use of. Prospero seeks to objectify and rigidify the subjectivities of 
those in his thrall so that he may ensure their utter confinement while still rendering them 
capable of proving useful to his project. The figurative death that this entails leaves all 
the inhabitants of the isle rigidified within what Lauren Berlant aptly terms dead 
citizenship. As she writes in The Queen of America Goes to Washington City, this 
citizenship is characterized as dead by signifying “identities not live, or in play, but dead, 
frozen, fixed, and at rest” (Berlant 60). Prospero’s figurative killing of Alonso 
emblematizes the particular type of death he inflicts upon those around him throughout 
the play. As with Alonso, these are not literal murders but rather symbolic deaths that 
engender a fixed confinement that leaves them objectified and thus passive components 
of Prospero’s plot. Their deaths rigidify them so that they are still functional and useful to 
Prospero while conveniently incapable of the kind of movement that would hinder the 
careful machinations of his plot. This confined functionality keeps Ariel, Caliban, and 
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Alonso rooted in the place that serves Prospero’s ends the best. The image of Alonso’s 
corpse here evoked is thus particularly significant: it embodies the nonliteral but 
nonetheless mortifying mode of death that Prospero relies so heavily upon.  
  In Act 4, Prospero reminds Ferdinand that “If I have too austerely punished you, / 
Your compensation makes amends” (4.1.1-2). Though he refers there to the prize of 
Miranda, Ferdinand is offered commemorative compensation in the musically delivered 
news of his father’s death as well. “The ditty does remember my drowned father,” 
(1.2.409-410), Ferdinand observes, “Allaying…my passion / With its sweet air” (1.2.395-
396). That Prospero can be seen to make two attempts to reconcile his dynamic with 
Ferdinand reveals much about the valences of his project. Ferdinand, innocent in so far as 
he has himself done Prospero no wrong, cannot justifiably merit the punishment that 
Prospero asserts the others on the isle deserve.5 Prospero ordinarily deploys remembrance 
to validate the violence of his actions and thus deny their violence at all. He must here, 
however, find other ways to resist accumulating a debt of any kind to Ferdinand so that 
he will not be left with anything to make amends for himself after his revenge plot has 
reached the definitive end he plans for it. The allaying comfort offered Ferdinand 
becomes the means through which he here renders remembrance as that which will rid 
him of any and all accountability: commemoration becomes compensatory, and as he will 
later assert with the ‘gift’ of Miranda, this compensation is meant to right any wrongs 
Prospero’s “austere punish[ment]” (4.1.1) may have opened up.6 As soon as there is debt, 
there is movement: to be held accountable for something is to acknowledge 
imperfectability and incompletion. This move to avoid the debt that his administration of 
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social death might otherwise create is a move he deploys throughout, and it serves to 
make the telos of reconciled completion possible.  
 The commemorative remembrance Prospero offers Alonso ultimately works to 
ensure stasis in another, more sweeping way as well. De Certeau discusses the perils of 
such remembrance in The Writing of History: 
Alphonse Dupront has said, “The sole historical quest for ‘meaning’ 
remains indeed a quest for the Other,” but, however contradictory it may 
be, this project aims at “understanding” and, through “meaning,” at hiding 
the alterity of the foreigner; or, in what amounts to the same thing, it aims 
at calming the dead who still haunt the present, and at offering them 
scriptural tombs. (de Certeau 2) 
 
The risk of ‘calming’ the dead here identified is the risk of silencing them, of alleviating 
the ethical imperative to the past that they would otherwise demand. This means of 
commemoration offers a burial that, ironically, facilitates remembrance only so that it can 
be eventually forgotten. This forgetting takes the form of an absolution of responsibility. 
With the entombment of the lost other of the past comes an appeasement, and this 
necrological model of history sees this scriptural burial as little more than a means of 
inciting a mourning that can eventually be completed and thus put to rest.7 This is the 
project Prospero has in mind from the beginning: he enforces re-memory so that he may 
eventually freeze all need for it. The remembrance he evokes works toward a finality, and 
thus also toward a forgetting. He remembers Alonso and the web of violences he 
represents so that he can be buried, covered over, mourned, and put to rest. The figurative 
killing and commemorative remembering of Alonso, then, comes to symbolize the major 
goals of Prospero’s project at large: the social death that reshapes people into objects to 
be wielded; the attempt to veil the violences of that murderous imposition in order to 
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excavate accountability and the temporal fluidity it opens up; and the ultimate 
construction of a remembrance that paradoxically works toward a forgetting. All three of 
these processes work to fix and make static that which would otherwise resist Prospero’s 
desire for reaching an endpoint at which history will finally stand still.  
 The past that Prospero constructs and demands be recounted attains its status as 
illusorily whole by a process of careful selection that omits details that would force 
reconsideration of the telos its created for. Garrett Sullivan discusses Early Modern 
conceptions of forgetting as “not…the erasure of knowledge…but as an action or series 
of actions that represents a particular disposition toward that knowledge” (Sullivan 66). 
This agency of choice in the process of recollection engenders a self-forgetting that 
fosters and justifies sinful behavior.8 In demanding that sins and debts be remembered, 
Prospero holds others responsible for the move away from an Edenic past imagined as 
untainted by any such sin. Striving for a future in which all will have been forced into 
reconciliation and thus returned to a past free of the need for violence, it is paramount 
that Prospero omit the realities of his own violences lest he end up himself accountable 
for them and re-mobilize the temporal dynamic of such past accountability he strives to 
anchor and dispel.9 Imagining memory as composed of different fragments of material 
capable of being rearranged and edited is a helpful way of approaching Prospero’s 
selective will to re-memory, in which he obsessively reminds others of their own crimes 
and debts while willfully forgetting his own.10  
 Act 1, Scene 2 provides a generative series of exchanges that illustrate this 
selective process of re-memory and self-forgetting that Prospero enforces. As several 
critics have noted, this act has Prospero reminding Miranda, Ariel, and Caliban of past 
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events. The way Prospero deploys his narrative of the past to confine Ariel explicitly is a 
fruitful starting point. Ariel, reminding Prospero that he “promise[d] / To bate [him] a full 
year” (1.2.250-251), makes a request for his freedom that Prospero denies with a series of 
questions that force Ariel to recall the debt he owes: “Dost thou forget / From what a 
torment I did free thee” (1.2.252-253)? Some permutation of this question is asked of 
Ariel four times and Prospero’s declaration that he must “Once in a month recount what 
[Ariel] has been, / Which [he] forget’st” (1.2.264-265) further implies the frequency with 
which such exchange occurs. Prospero here clearly utilizes remembrance to stabilize the 
power imbalance of their relationship and thus keep Ariel firmly fixed in place. By 
pointing to Ariel’s past imprisonment, Prospero justifies and ensures the maintenance of 
his still-existing confinement. This moment functions within Prospero’s futurist narrative 
by justifying the terms of the present and thus ridding it of any future need to be 
accounted for. If Prospero’s utilization of a futurist logic functions to imagine a cohesive 
future free of debt that marks a return to an Imaginary past, then this fantasy is here 
maintained by Prospero’s willful ignorance of his own present-day crimes. Thus, he 
presents a narrative of the past that calcifies the possibility of a future free of the need for 
remembrance. This is accomplished by his forcing Ariel to recount the tale in a manner 
that omits Prospero’s own injustices and the debts they themselves open up. For Prospero 
to admit the violence inherent to his enslavement of Ariel would unsettle that simple 
trajectory of his project, aiming as it does for a future conclusively absolved of all such 
injustices. Forcing Ariel to recount a narrative of his past that forgets the moment in 
which Prospero re-enslaves him is the way in which Prospero compensates for the 
violence of that moment. “Dost thou forget / From what a torment I did free thee” 
	   11	  
(1.2.252-253), he asks Ariel, forgetting himself the torment that he keeps him in by virtue 
of that very enforcement of re-memory. If Prospero’s treatment of Alonso’s illusorily 
drowned body abstractly emblematized the processes of his project, we here see him 
impose those processes on Ariel: he rigidifies him within a dead citizenship that leaves 
him functional but immobile, attempts to compensate for that figurative killing through a 
remembrance strategically shaped by selective forgetting, and labors toward a frozen 
future by dispossessing any and all accountability for these very actions.  
 This scene displays another means Prospero uses to both make his subjects 
utilizable and justify that violence. Names number among the materials Prospero is 
willing to forget in order to strengthen the force of his carefully edited narrative of the 
past. Prospero, reminding Ariel of the state Sycorax left him in, is naturally led to 
mention Caliban, her son, who is currently enslaved under Prospero just as Ariel is. 
Prospero takes three lines to express his contempt for Caliban without once using his 
name: “Save for the son that she did litter here, / A freckled whelp, hag-born – not 
honoured with / A human shape” (1.2.284-286). This moment of un-naming 
accomplishes two major things. Firstly, it works to strip Caliban of the basic marker of 
personhood that renders him something more than an object to be utilized. Prospero’s 
tendency to rid people of their names to emphasize their objectified utility is a move he 
enacts on Ariel and Miranda, as well. In this scene alone, he refers to Ariel as “malignant 
thing” (1.2.258) and “dull thing” (1.2.288). When talking to Ferdinand in the opening 
scene of Act 4, Miranda is referred to as “my gift and thine own acquisition / Worthily 
purchased” (4.1.14-15).11 Turning persons into things, and names into reified terms, is a 
move Prospero makes several times. By forgetting names, he conveniently forgets also 
	   12	  
the personhood that would complicate the immobility he needs from those in his thrall, 
and forces others to forget it, too. Caliban’s un-naming in this scene, then, works both to 
objectify him and to negate the violence of that objectification and its accompanying 
enslavement. By referring to Caliban as subhuman object, Prospero refuses to take 
responsibility for the subjugated position he has forced him into.12 This is how Prospero’s 
narrative of remembrance functions as a “mnemonic of power,” as Paul Brown termed it 
(Brown 59): by presenting only the elements that render him eternally in the right and 
leaving out, or forgetting, all that would necessitate he eventually re-enter the temporal 
cycle that accountability opens up.  
 In the words of de Certeau, the selective narrative breakage that Prospero makes 
use of leaves behind “shards created by the selection of materials” that “come back, 
despite everything, on the edges of discourse or in its rifts and crannies: ‘resistances,’ 
‘survivals,’ or delays discreetly perturb the pretty order of a line of ‘progress’ or a system 
of interpretation” (de Certeau 4). Prospero’s self-forgotten materials, then, allow for the 
maintenance of a seemingly autonomous narrative that is in actuality made vulnerable by 
the very omitted gaps that bolster it. This vulnerability of Prospero’s project has not gone 
unnoticed. Paul Brown notes that “the narrative is fraught because it reveals internal 
contradictions which strain its ostensible project and because it produces the possibility 
of sites of resistance in the other precisely at the moment when it seeks to impose its 
captivating power” (Brown 59). Kevin Ohi similarly draws attention to the impossibility 
of Prospero’s obsessive appeals to the past, declaring “that everything in the play…must, 
by the displaced Duke’s command, be retold or reenacted seems to compel the 
forgetfulness it aims to forestall” (Ohi 354). Ohi reads in this central forgetfulness of the 
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text the ideal space to read queerness into the play, arguing that it potentializes queer 
readings and histories. While I agree with the central assertion that the counterintuitive 
character of Prospero’s remembrance marks a space in which queer interpretations of the 
play may be facilitated, I posit that the queer potentiality it opens up is better read 
through Ariel than Prospero, as it is Ariel who takes these ideological gaps and institutes 
a queer theoretical praxis through their shortcomings. 
The fragility of Prospero’s project is illustrated in the instance of the first 
command we see him give Ariel in Act 2, Scene 1. Line 320 marks the moment in which 
the order is given, and yet the pivotal utterance is omitted in favor of a stage direction 
indicating that he whispers something in his ear. That our only access to this original 
command is through Ariel’s eventual execution of it points to the fragility of Prospero’s 
control over the project he considers his. The thrust of his instruction here literally exists 
only insofar as Ariel performs it. This originary absence informs the interplay between 
the two characters from start to finish, and the assertion here that Prospero’s order holds 
its force only through Ariel’s enforced moments of repetition provides the very means 
through which that force is continuously unsettled by Ariel throughout.13 In granting 
Ariel the singular power to stabilize the plot he has in mind, Prospero ignores the 
capacity for reiteration that Ariel utilizes instead. Ariel carries out his commands to the 
letter as he must, but with a difference that foregrounds that which Prospero willingly 
forgets in order to maintain his fantasy of autonomous stability: these forgotten remains 
always re-infiltrate the narrative Prospero wants to contain free of them. These remains 
that Ariel implicitly enforces re-memory of are Prospero’s own violences. Where 
Prospero seeks to bring his project to a head by inflicting the final punishment that will 
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allow for a return to Imaginary wholeness where all sins have been purged and debts 
have been paid, Ariel persistently reminds him of the crimes he himself will have to pay 
for when all is seemingly done. This capacity to remember and remind the text of the 
untenability of Prospero’s project is encouraged by the gaps that moments like line 320 
open up. The initial moment that seemingly signifies Prospero’s total control is always in 
some sense ‘lost’ to us. The fact that these moments are accessible only through Ariel’s 
reiterative utterances both points to the untenable character of his fantasy and opens up 
pathways to resistance. In the absence of the originary command, perfect repetition is in 
fact impossible: reiteration is all that Prospero can demand.  
 
“BUT DOTH SUFFER A SEA-CHANGE”: ARIEL, SPECTRALITY, AND RE-MEMORY 
REITERATED 
Critical discussion concerning Ariel has been relatively scarce, especially when 
compared to the oft-discussed and similarly enslaved Caliban.14 Holger Henke and Mary 
Moore have both written recently on the disruptive potential of the character, exploring 
the destabilizing force his presence offers the text. Henke looks to Ariel as a 
metatheoretical symbol for “the force of ideas that…slowly and incrementally move the 
course of history” (Henke 45). Mary Moore is less explicitly concerned with Ariel’s 
resistant capacities but nonetheless renders him as that which “fracture[s] grammar, 
spatial, and temporal logic in ways that amaze and confound” (Moore 496).15 Henke’s 
identification of Ariel as emblematic of an anti-essentialist politic acknowledges the 
minute shifts he can be seen to enact throughout the course of the play. Moore’s reading 
of Ariel as a boundary-crossing, indeterminate figure similarly begins to imagine his 
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capacity to fragment the general notion of stability so essential to Prospero’s plot. Both 
critics ultimately shift the bulk of their analytic focus elsewhere, however, and in this 
paper I seek to take on an interrogation of the specific ways his creative, spectral 
servitude leaves its mark upon the play. This task hinges on the interplay between 
Prospero’s remembrance-as-death and Ariel’s remembrance-as-resistance, and as such I 
will now be returning to the textual moments already examined in order to illustrate the 
ways in which Ariel responds to and resists Prospero’s project.  
Ariel significantly carries out the rendering of Alonso’s body in Act 1, Scene 2 at 
Prospero’s command. The latter half of the song he performs to accomplish this captures 
the reiterative and transformative quality he deploys throughout the text to render mobile 
that which Prospero seeks to fix: 
Full fathom five thy father lies. 
Of his bones are coral made; 
Those are pearls that were his eyes; 
Nothing of him that doth fade 
But doth suffer a sea-change 
Into something rich and strange. (1.2.400-406) 
 
There are several things about this textual moment that I would like to engage from 
Ariel’s end. I want to look first at how it emblematizes the reiterative praxis Ariel uses 
throughout. From there, I want to examine the ethical and commemorative force this 
praxis facilitates, before positing the ways in which this commemorative move evades the 
closure of entombment that allows for the illusion of finality and thus stability. I propose 
that this moment encapsulates the reiterative ethic Ariel deploys to keep subjectivities 
and the temporal trajectory they are enmeshed within fluid, mobile, and insistent on a 
remembrance that demands accountability rather than retribution. This scene, then, 
reveals the counter-processes that Ariel utilizes to fragment the force of Prospero’s 
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narrative. Where Prospero sought to assert death and a compensatory forgetting, Ariel 
reiteratively foregrounds spectrality and a remembrance that actively resists the 
equalizing force of any compensatory effort. 
 The transformation of Alonso’s body that Ariel here mobilizes exemplifies the 
poetic praxis he uses throughout the text. This praxis, reiterative and seemingly 
subservient in nature, works to unsettle the force of Prospero’s order even as it acts it out. 
The presentation of the slain body reveals the particular form that Prospero’s violence 
takes, and in describing it as nonfading but as undergoing transformation, Ariel describes 
also the tactic he puts to use in order to undermine said violence: the will of Prospero 
does not fade in the execution of his commands, but rather undergoes a metamorphic 
change that diminishes its paralyzing intention. Ariel repeats with a “sea-change” 
(1.2.404) that produces an indeterminacy that denies the immutability Prospero desires. 
This ethic of indeterminacy resists the fixity that characterizes Prospero’s infliction of 
death. Alonso as rendered by Ariel is not confined, static, or lost, but capable of a 
transformation that, in making him strange, grants him the material ambiguity that keeps 
him in play.  Rather than being anchored underwater, dead and immobilized, Alonso 
undergoes transformation into something more than a corpse to be mourned, forgotten, 
and put aside. Where Prospero wants him turned to stone, Ariel turns him to coral, 
ornamental but also live. 
 Ariel’s persistence on unfinished indeterminacy resonates with what Carla 
Freccero calls queer spectrality. The figure of the specter, collapsing boundaries between 
absence/presence, living/dead, and past/present, is fittingly emblematic of the mobile 
subjectivity a queer praxis calls for. It is also central to a way of thinking history, and it is 
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in this image of the specter that the boundary between even the living and figuratively 
dead ultimately collapses. The existence of the ghost, as a material trace of the violent 
past, necessitates that we be held accountable for that past. As Freccero explains, “[the] 
willingness to be haunted is an ethical relation to the world, motivated by a concern not 
only for the past but also for the future, for those who live in the borderlands without a 
home” (Freccero 75). The significance of maintaining the syncretic existence of these 
borderlands is itself the ethical payoff of this spectral approach, because the refusal to 
stabilize categorical definitions is one of the means through which these subjectivities are 
kept, to borrow from Berlant once more, live and in play rather than dead and at rest. 
Freccero’s assertion of a spectral approach to the dead foregrounds the significance of a 
haunting that resists stable anchors of identity and meaning. What must be imagined, she 
argues, is an approach to history “that would neither ‘forget the dead’ nor ‘successfully’ 
mourn them” (Freccero 78). For mourning to be successful would be itself a forgetting, or 
a closing-off of the past that absolves one from being held accountable to it. A queer 
responsibility necessitates remaining open and receptive to the violences of the past, 
keeping its dead not buried but aggressively present even in their absence. Ariel manages 
exactly this in his rendering of Alonso’s body. He offers a moment of remembrance that 
commemorates but avoids the risk of anchoring Alonso by presenting not a corpse but a 
body in flux. Rather than putting him properly at rest, Ariel grants Alonso a ghostly and 
mobile subjectivity that is strange and unpalatable rather than easily digestible and thus 
appropriable. With this strangeness comes a categorical indeterminacy that spurns the 
possibility of confining the dead within a grave that diminishes their residual ability to 
haunt. If the danger de Certeau and Freccero recognize in a necrological model of history 
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is its tendency to hide the alterity of the dead other, Ariel instead highlights this very 
alterity by characterizing Alonso’s body as peculiar and thus emblematic of the 
transformative capacity for strangeness and unlikeness that characterizes spectrality itself.  
 Ariel’s treatment of Alonso’s body responds to Prospero’s in three major ways, 
then. Firstly, it counters the social death he imposes by granting Alonso a reiterative 
capacity for transformation that undercuts the immobility Prospero wants of him. 
Secondly, it resists a compensatory forgetting by rendering Alonso as something strange 
and thus characterized by an inconsumable residue that possesses a spectral effect and 
refuses clean or easy mourning. Finally, this spectrality demands an approach to history 
that denies all equalizing or reconciling measures: despite Prospero’s best efforts to make 
and enforce amends, the materials he seeks to bury and forget will always come back to 
haunt him. Try as he might to make history and all those around him stand still so he may 
reach a peaceful end, Ariel ensures he is continuously reminded of the residual traces of 
all the violences that he still must answer for. Where this interchange of remembrance-as-
death and remembrance-as-resistance plays out abstractly on the symbolic space of 
Alonso’s poeticized body, I’d like to turn now to the ways in which it marks noticeable 
shifts in the trajectory of the text. This is achieved most powerfully through the 
reiterative interruptions Ariel enacts in his exchange with Prospero in Act 2, Scene 1.  
Prospero’s interrogative reminders of Ariel’s past imprisonment in this scene 
function to justify the position he currently keeps him in: “I must / Once in a month 
recount what thou has been, / Which thou forget’st” (2.1.263-265). Prospero makes 
several demands that Ariel himself speak the narrative so he may better remember. 
Prospero, by demanding throughout this scene that Ariel repeatedly acknowledge the 
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reality of the story being retold, unwittingly provides Ariel the means to reveal the gaps 
in Prospero’s presentation of the narrative.16 Throughout this exchange, Ariel points to 
the violences Prospero is omitting when speaking of Sycorax’s own injustices. As 
Prospero picks up on when noting that Ariel reported himself as Prospero’s slave 
(1.2.272-273), Ariel makes repeated reference to his own degraded subject position. By 
so doing, he actively derails the narrative of kindness and debt that Prospero is positing as 
justification for his position as master. Where he before reports himself as slave in a less 
pointed manner, with references to Prospero as “great master” (1.2.190) or “my master” 
(emphasis mine, 1.2.217), he switches to the unadorned bluntness of naming Prospero 
simply “master” as soon as Prospero tells the story of Ariel’s prior imprisonment. 
Responding to Prospero’s tale of supposedly freeing him with “I thank thee, master” 
(1.2.295) points to the still-radical unfreedom Prospero has left him suspended within yet 
tries to cover up. Though reiterating and affirming Prospero’s story as demanded of him, 
Ariel’s pointed references to himself as servant bring to the fore the reality of the 
dynamic between the two characters that Prospero seems eager to veil. Prospero wants to 
remind Ariel of the debt he owes him for ‘freeing’ him while ignoring the debt he himself 
acquired by immediately re-confining him.17 Punctuating every seemingly affirmative 
utterance with the word “master” both opens up a demand for accountability that shatters 
Prospero’s self-righteous narrative and likens the confined torment Ariel experienced in 
the pine tree to his current subject position. With each iteration of the word “master” 
Ariel highlights the imprisonment he remains within, Sycorax or no. By here reiterating 
the status of slave that Prospero has imposed upon him, Ariel discovers and utilizes a 
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resistant agency that allows him to subtly deepen the cracks in Prospero’s untenable 
narrative while still appearing compliant with the demands for validation made of him.  
The disruption Ariel accomplishes by way of reiteration is even more blatantly 
spelled out at another instance of this same scene. Prospero’s discussion of Sycorax 
brings him to make reference to Caliban who is, like Ariel, under Prospero’s command. 
Prospero here strips Caliban of his name, as previously discussed. Immediately following 
Prospero’s reference to Caliban as “A freckled whelp, hag-born – Not honoured with / A 
human shape” (1.2.285-286), Ariel interrupts to affirm this assertion of fact with a key 
difference: “Yes, Caliban her son,” he states (1.2.287). Prospero, who has required that 
Ariel repeat him throughout this scene, here bizarrely condemns Ariel for doing just that, 
expressing anger over Ariel interrupting him to seemingly add nothing of value to the 
dialogue (1.2.288). That Prospero fails to see the difference in what he and Ariel 
vocalized reveals an inability on his part to distinguish between exact repetition and 
reiteration. Ariel’s interjection here is, significantly, the first utterance of Caliban’s name 
in the play, and although Prospero claims the response was a pointless one, he then 
himself goes on to refer to Caliban by name as well. Ariel’s reiterative interruption brings 
Caliban’s name into the text, doing him the decency of being referred to as something 
other than “a freckled whelp, hag-born” (1.2.285).18 This is a resistant move, for both 
Caliban and for Ariel himself.19 Ariel interrupts a rant that validates the terms of his own 
imprisonment to remind Prospero that his other servant has a name. Where Prospero 
justified Ariel’s enslavement by reminding him that he freed him from the tree he was 
trapped within, he here also justifies Caliban’s by making detailed reference to his 
perceived status as subhuman. By enforcing remembrance of Caliban’s name, Ariel once 
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more draws attention to the materials Prospero is willing to forget in order to fortify his 
self-righteous position. What Prospero opts to forget here is his imprisonment of Caliban 
and the barbaric nature of that confinement, a forgetting that he incites by forgetting his 
name and the personhood attached to it. Prospero attempts to absolve himself of all 
accountability for this action by rendering Caliban a nameless, inhuman figure whose 
servitude is thus naturally warranted, but Ariel’s seemingly repetitive and affirmative 
intervention functions to assert the very personhood that Prospero willfully forgets. The 
charges against Caliban that Prospero’s injurious declarations here convey are 
immediately undercut by Ariel’s interruption, and Ariel’s ethic can be seen to emerge in a 
manner so craftily that Prospero both fails to recognize it and falls prey to its 
machinations. Ariel’s reminder here that the so-called “freckled whelp” (1.2.285) has a 
name bears the trace of a polemic against Prospero that inevitably colors every hateful 
utterance of the name thereafter.20 This seemingly minimal shift that Ariel rouses in the 
trajectory of the text is perhaps one of the reasons why Caliban so generously refers to 
Ariel as “a harmless fairy” (4.1.196), and why he recognizes that Ariel does “hate 
[Prospero] / As rootedly as [he]” (3.2.89-90) where so many critics do not.21 
 
CONCLUSION 
The ethical significance of a mourning unfinished, a finality forever deferred, is 
one central to the closing acts of The Tempest. Act 3, Scene 3 sees Ariel finally 
encountering Antonio and his men on Prospero’s behalf. Remembrance has a key role to 
play in this confrontational moment: 
But remember, 
For that’s my business to you, that you three 
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From Milan did supplant good Prospero; 
Exposed unto the sea, which hath requit it, 
Him and his innocent child; for which foul deed 
The powers, delaying not forgetting, have 
Incensed the sea and shores, yea, all the creatures, 
Against your peace. (3.3.68-75) 
 
Prospero is overjoyed by the display, congratulating Ariel on the perfection of his 
repetition when he states “Of my instruction hast thou nothing bated / In what thou hadst 
to say” (3.3.85-86). It seems at first as though Ariel’s utilization of remembrance is in 
this moment uncharacteristically in accord with Prospero’s own. His trademark 
reiterative difference initially seems absent, and he acts as the primary agent of a 
petrifying action here: as he later relays to Prospero, this encounter leaves the men 
confined together and incapable of budging until Prospero decides to release them (5.1.8-
11). This moment of petrification, rendered in literal terms, is at odds with the 
mobilization Ariel has sought to catalyze throughout the play. What, then, can Ariel be 
said to achieve in this scene? I posit that this speech is in fact disrupted by a crucial 
moment of reiterative performance that can be found in lines 73-74, in which Ariel 
declares that the powers have delayed rather than forgotten the punishment owed for the 
exile of Prospero. This conception of a final punishment delayed is central to Ariel’s 
actions in the latter half of the play, for Ariel’s strategic deferring of any kind of final 
reconciliation is the way in which he mobilizes the historical past itself by refusing to 
allow it to ever reach a state of peaceful closure. Prospero views this scene as the moment 
that allows his project to “gather to a head” (5.1.1). As he has made clear throughout, 
what he ultimately seeks is completion, an end. He has sought to bring the cycle of 
violence that has characterized his relationship to Antonio to an end by preparing a final, 
stabilizing punishment that will put the whole affair at rest. Ariel, fragmenting the 
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seemingly perfect repetition of his speech to Antonio and his men by privileging the 
power of delay, foregrounds a deferral that recognizes a push against finality as more 
ethically generative than a project of revenge completed. “Ling’ring perdition,” he states, 
is “worse than any death” (3.3.77). The stasis that death allows is an insufficient end, and 
it is in removing the possibility of any such reconciled ending that Ariel finds value. 
Antonio must remain forever accountable for his crimes, and it is in enforcing this 
endless accountability that the major thrust of Ariel’s ethic emerges. The violences of the 
past cannot be compensated for, buried, and put out of mind. They must, as Ariel 
articulates, “step by step attend / You and your ways” (3.3.78-79). The punishment this 
scene promises is undercut by this forceful articulation of the necessity of its delay, and 
Ariel here sets the stage in a manner that will later allow him to ensure this delay persists 
indefinitely. 
 This delay of punishment culminates in the closing act of the play, courtesy of 
Ariel. Act 5, Scene 1 illustrates a final moment in which Prospero’s will to repetition 
becomes the means through which Ariel fragments the futurist trajectory of his narrative. 
The scene tellingly opens with Prospero prepared for his project to “gather to a head” 
(5.1.1) and he spends his opening lines obsessing over the details necessary to ensure its 
perfection. Prospero, eager to see his plot come to its close, again demonstrates the role 
his enforced re-memory has to play in achieving the death-like stasis he anticipates. The 
exchange with Ariel that follows, however, utterly disrupts this planned move toward 
completion. Prospero, asking Ariel to repeat the states Antonio and his followers were 
left in, seeks re-confirmation that Antonio and his men are confined and ready to be 
worked upon. Prospero demands that their stricken plights be restated for him, wanting 
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himself to remember and thus cement this final piece of his plot. Ariel, noting that they 
remain in the same, stuck state he left them in, draws attention to the desire for repetition 
Prospero’s request elicits. He also takes full advantage of this opportunity to reiterate and 
disrupt, as he has throughout. In discursively replicating the scene for Prospero again, 
Ariel renders it sympathetically. Prospero is met with an illustration of their state that 
reveals the violence that led to it. By reiterating the reality of their dire straits, Ariel 
imbues a difference that fully implicates Prospero for his violent role in its construction. 
Ariel rearticulates the scene to evoke the fact of Prospero’s own involvement, and by so 
doing opens up the space of responsibility that fosters its transmutation. Already, as he 
re-performs the scene for Prospero, he is mobilizing it, rendering its desolate, literal fixity 
in terms that open up the complex web of debts that Prospero wants closed off. The 
image of Gonzalo in particular, “tears run[ning] down his beard like winter’s drops / 
From eaves of reeds” (5.1.10-11), is a strategically placed one on Ariel’s part. The focus 
on Gonzalo serves as an implicit reminder of the “gentleness” (1.2.166) and “charity” 
(1.2.163) Gonzalo showed Prospero upon his exile from Milan. The reiterative nature of 
this instance of re-memory is made explicit when Ariel reminds Prospero of what he has 
said about Gonzalo in the past: “Him that you termed, sir, the good lord Gonzalo” 
(5.1.15). Rearticulating Prospero’s past descriptions of Gonzalo back at him functions as 
a reminder of a debt. In addition to necessitating accountability for the state he has left 
Antonio and his men in, he is accountable also for the goodwill he was shown in the past 
and seems all too eager to suddenly forget. This remembrance that Ariel evokes is used 
here not to catalyze a punishment but a reminder of mutual and un-reconcilable 
	   25	  
responsibility that strips the revenge trope of its end and leaves all parties accountable for 
their actions by virtue of that very endlessness.  
 Prospero’s decision to release Antonio and his men utterly disrupts the arc he’s 
had in mind since the beginning. In addition to Ariel’s sympathetic re-rendering of the 
states of the king and his men, his assertion that Prospero’s affections would become 
tender if he himself looked upon it has a particularly moving effect on Prospero. He 
responds to this claim by asking Ariel his first non-rhetorical question, or the first 
question that doesn’t act also as a demand or reminder of servitude: “Dost thou think so, 
spirit” (5.1.19)?22 This question, like most of the questions Prospero asks, does demand 
an act of repetition on Ariel’s part, but a repetition of a markedly different sort. Ariel, 
given the chance to repeat himself rather than Prospero, is allowed an agency in this 
moment more explicit than any he’s been given at any other point of the play thus far. 
Ariel here manages to unstick Prospero from the predictable finality of his revenge plot. 
Where Prospero’s questions have before been uttered as a means of ensuring said plot 
and all its minute machinations move forward with no unpredictability, he here asks of 
Ariel a genuine question that unsettles the trajectory of his arc and the imagined cohesion 
it seeks to regain and re-establish. Prospero goes on from here to famously conclude that 
“the rarer action is / In virtue than in vengeance” (5.1.27-28), and asks Ariel to release 
them. It is Ariel’s reiterative ethic that brings about this pivotal shift in the play’s action, 
and it is here that the efficacy of his praxis is fully realized as he manages to secure 
release for himself and all the others under Prospero’s enthrallment. 
 Ariel responds to Prospero’s question about softening affections by saying “Mine 
would, sir, were I human” (5.1.20). That Ariel persuades Prospero to shift the course of 
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his plan by drawing attention to Ariel’s status as non-human is telling. Prospero’s act of 
forgiveness is here made possible through Ariel’s articulation of his own inability to feel 
or forgive. Given the push against finality that I have argued Ariel strives for throughout 
the play, it is worth considering Derrida’s conception of forgiveness here. Derrida argues 
that forgiveness is only genuine when it is not functioning to establish any kind of 
finality. Forgiveness for Derrida cannot be normative or normalizing, and “should remain 
exceptional and extraordinary, in the face of the impossible as if it interrupted the 
ordinary course of history” (Derrida 32). The logic of exchange and reconciliation so 
entrenched within all normative models of forgiveness renders it false or impure. The 
only way to achieve a forgiveness that unsettles the counter intuitively violent logic of 
finality is to find a way that disentangles it from a reconciliation that seeks to restore 
some imagined order of things. Embracing the aporia necessarily inherent to his 
imagining of such forgiveness, Derrida states “forgiveness must announce itself as 
impossibility itself” (Derrida 33). The forgiveness that Ariel catalyzes in Act 5, Scene 1 
is non-normalizing. It is facilitated from such a space of impossibility: his statement 
“mine would, sir, were I human” (5.1.20) is an aporetic utterance, conveying the paradox 
of a figure not human proving himself more capable of human emotions than Prospero 
himself. The terms of Ariel’s release have already been decided and he has nothing to 
gain from prodding Prospero toward “virtue” (5.1.28) here. The forgiveness that Ariel 
brings into the play has no discernible telos other than to delay the telos that Prospero’s 
project has itself been working up to. By urging Prospero to forgive, Ariel delays the 
punishment that would foster reconciliation.23 Ariel’s forgiveness works to defer rather 
than to finalize, and by so doing mobilizes the mutual accountability that keeps the past 
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and future porous and radically un-anchored. As Ariel himself articulated in Act 3, Scene 
3, delaying is not forgetting. In fact, the only way to effectively not forget, to avoid the 
“successful” mourning Freccero warned of, is to delay the act of punishment that would 
allow for the illusion of a stabilizing absolution. This delay takes the form of a moment 
of extraordinary forgiveness in the closing act of The Tempest, and Ariel’s rendering of 
forgiveness as deferral keeps it from adhering to the conclusiveness that would undercut 
the telos-defying aim of his project.  
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Endnotes 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Lee Edelman’s No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive asserts that a queer 
politic “insists…on the impossibility of Symbolic closure” (Edelman 48). Several queer 
theorists have similarly engaged the question of queer temporality and its refusal of 
teleology: Judith Halberstam in In a Queer Time and Place: Transgender Bodies, 
Subcultural Lives, Jonathan Goldberg in “Queering History,” and Carla Freccero in 
Queer/Early/Modern, among others.	  	  2	  As	  Judith Butler writes in Excitable Speech, “agency begins where sovereignty wanes” 
(Butler 16). Prospero’s sovereignty wanes precisely through his compulsive need to have 
his particular interpretation of the past repeatedly asserted. 	  3	  Judith Butler reminds us, “reiterations are never simply replicas of the same” (Butler 
226). 	  4	  Stephen Orgel discusses retrospection within the play and its close attention to 
“recounting and re-enacting past action [and] evoking and educating the memory” (Orgel 
5). From there, Jane Wilkinson, Dympna Callaghan, and Jonathan Baldo have all 
examined the interplay between memory and colonialism throughout the text. 	  5	  It is telling that Ferdinand, as a white male who is “the best of them that speak this 
speech” (4.1.433), is the only person Prospero seems eager to ensure he is not indebted 
to. He justifies his treatment of Antonio and his men by remembering their exiling him, 
his treatment of Caliban by pointing to his subhuman status, and his treatment of Ariel by 
reminding him of the debt he owes him. Ferdinand, as the only person Prospero 
genuinely fears being held accountable to, is the only figure Prospero recognizes as a 
genuine threat to his project. He thus makes attempts to compensate for his undue 
punishment of him in ways he doesn’t offer other characters.	  	  	  6	  Treating Miranda as a ‘gift’ to be won is of course another example of the utilizable 
objectification Prospero imposes upon those around him. For more on Miranda’s role to 
play in Prospero’s attempt to regain sovereign stability, see Melissa E. Sanchez’s 
“Seduction and Service in ‘The Tempest.’”  	  7	  The phrase “necrological model of history” comes from Carla Freccero’s reading of de 
Certeau in Queer/Early/Modern (Freccero 70).	  	  	  8	  	  Sullivan makes these claims in the context of specifically salvational knowledge and 
Dr. Faustus. This link between salvation and memory is drawn from John Donne’s 1618 
sermon that argued “the art of salvation, is but the art of memory” (Donne, qtd by 
Sullivan 67).  	  9	  Sullivan	  refers	  to	  this	  as	  ‘self-­‐forgetting,’	  referencing	  the Puritan divine Paul Baynes, 
who asks “What makes men sweare, bowze, give place to their lusts, goe on in hardnesse 
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of heart?” and answers, “it is forgetting themselves, and never once considering what 
they doe, and how they goe on” (Baynes, qtd by Sullivan 66) 	  10	  This selective recollection was informed by the logic of medieval memory training and 
the influence it still held in the Renaissance. Mary Carruthers describes this process of 
memory training as being centered around “the fundamental principle…to ‘divide’ the 
material to be remembered into pieces short enough to be recalled in single units and to 
key these into some sort of rigid, easily reconstructable order” (Carruthers 155). 	  11	  Orlando Patterson writes, “the changing of a name is almost universally a symbolic act 
of stripping a person of his former identity” (Patterson 55). 	  12	  As Prospero tells Miranda, he cannot do without him, as he makes their fire, fetches 
wood, and generally “serves in offices / That profit us” (1.2.315-316).	  	  	  13	  Where Prospero wants speech-acts, he can only ever see results through Ariel’s 
response.	  For more on speech-acts, see J.L. Austin’s How to Do Things with Words.	  	  	  14	  Jonathan Bate has asserted, “we have gone quite a long way towards recognizing the 
rights of Caliban…next we will need to set Ariel free” (Bate 162). Ariel has frequently 
been read as narrowly self-interested and politically ineffectual.  	  15	  Moore takes Ariel’s declaration of “I flamed amazement” (1.2.197) and reads in it a 
marvel of poetic language that makes reality (and ‘matter’) fluid and tractable: “‘I 
flamed’ means that Ariel emits or is flames, which in the normal order of things would 
consume him...his very narration, however, proves his survival, evoking wonder through 
the utterance itself” (Moore 496). The amazement Ariel evokes emerges specifically 
through his “play in and with language and matter throughout the play” (Moore 467). 
Moore posits that Ariel mimics the power of theatre itself in “fractur[ing] grammar and 
logic, blurring boundaries between things and acts” (Moore 502). 	  16	  Critics have noted that Prospero must have originally gotten the Sycorax narrative 
from Ariel in the first place. Ariel’s affirmation of Prospero’s version of it has been read 
as an utter submission on his part. Evelyn Tribble, for example, argues Ariel is here 
“figured as a non-participant in his own story” (Tribble 159). These claims ignore the 
ways in which Ariel subtly deploys resistance in his seeming submission to Prospero’s 
version of the past.	  	  17	  Paul Brown notes: “What is really at issue is the underlining of a power relation. Ariel 
is, paradoxically, bound in service by this constant reminder of Prospero’s gift of freedom 
to him, in releasing him from imprisonment in a tree” (Brown 60). He ultimately reads 
the scene as a moment in which Ariel consents to his subjugation, however (61).	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  18	  See Julia Reinhard Lupton’s “Creature Caliban” for a reading that characterizes 
Caliban as himself a disruptive figure by way of the bodily indeterminacy Prospero here 
uses as reason to imprison him.	  	  19	  I do not intend to undermine the resistance that Caliban effectively performs for 
himself throughout the play, which has already been explored by Paul Brown, Roberto 
Fernández Retamar, and several other critics who have detailed the colonial dynamic 
between Prospero and Caliban.	  	  	  20	  The significance of Ariel bringing Caliban’s name into the text is further made 
apparent when examining the intertextual echo of Montaigne’s “Of Cannibals” that his 
name contains. The act of uttering Caliban’s name in and of itself reifies a certain 
personhood for him, an assertion that is only strengthened by this evocation of “Of 
Cannibals” that his name kindles. Montaigne’s notion of the nobility of the savage, 
however misguidedly rendered, nonetheless counters the ideals of men like Prospero.  	  21	  Caliban’s affinity with the spirits (Ariel included) is expressed at multiple points 
throughout the play. I point this out because the critical tradition surrounding The 
Tempest has tended to dichotomize Caliban and Ariel when considering them as 
“symbols for a reorientation of...culture” (Millán-Zaibert 152).  While the play offers 
little in the way of explicit dialogic exchange between Ariel and Caliban, the manner in 
which they engage the other reveals, I think, a certain affinity between the two that is 
unacknowledged when they are critically positioned as at odds with one another. 	  22	  An observation made by Sarah Beckwith in her book Shakespeare and the Grammar of 
Forgiveness, who highlights this exchange as a moment in which Ariel “tutors Prospero 
in how to be human, how to be kind” (Beckwith 149).  	  23	  Evelyn	  Tribble	  notes	  that	  the	  play	  closes	  with	  full	  reconcilement	  never	  being	  fully	  achieved	  (Tribble	  164)	  and,	  as	  Stephen	  Orgel	  argues,	  “the	  point	  is	  not	  only	  that	  Antonio	  does	  not	  repent	  here,	  he	  is	  also	  not	  allowed	  to	  repent”	  (Orgel	  241).	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